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1 Introduction
We propose a refinement to the well known, and widely used, proof-of-work
scheme of zeroing a cryptographic hash [4, 1]. Our refinement is interesting
because it allows multiple autonomous users to cooperate on the proof-of-work
for their own transactions in order to bring about consensus on the order of said
transactions.
Our scheme is specifically designed to allow for easy cooperation. In con-
trast, on the unmodified version of the problem of zeroing a cryptographic hash
cooperation is possible only through the additional external machinery of min-
ing pools. Moreover, these solutions suffer from problems where participants are
actually incentivized not to cooperate [3].
An inherently cooperative scheme would instead allow us to replace transac-
tion fees (which are paid to transaction miners) by transaction taxes (which are
paid by transaction miners). This could, in turn, replace competition among
miners (which can have a potentially inflationary effect on power usage) with
frugal, minimal effort, cooperative strategies among users (which can have a
potentially mitigating effect on power usage).
Other potential benefits of our refinement include:
• increased defense against discrimination of (certain groups of) users by
transaction miners,
• increased throughput of the system as a whole in handling transactions
(because of reduced competition among miners),
• increased deterrence against DoS attacks (which will become costly due
to the transaction tax).
In the remainder of this paper we describe the problem of distributed con-
sensus, we explain the role of proof-of-work in solving the distributed consensus
problem and we formalize our proposed cooperative proof-of-work scheme.
1
2 Consensus
The problem of distributed consensus arises in the context of peer-to-peer net-
works. So let us assume we have a number of peers that can communicate on a
network. To make this more concrete we may say, for example, that peers are
using a gossiping protocol to disseminate information to each other [2].
In addition assume that there is a requirement to keep a distributed ledger
containing transactions (of some unspecified nature). All peers can fully au-
tonomously decide to join the public ledger and request transactions to be ap-
pended to it, but, at the same time, all peers must agree on what exactly are
the contents of the ledger at all times. Finally, and crucially, these requirements
are to be fulfilled without relying on any form of central authority. In particular
this means that using some a priori leader election protocol is not an acceptable
solution.
One of the first problems that we see is that messages sent by one peer take
some time to propagate through the network and become common knowledge
among all peers.
First note that, as long as the period in-between transactions is, statistically,
sufficiently higher than the time it takes a message to become common knowl-
edge, there is not a big problem in achieving consensus. All that peers need to
do, in that case, is to cache all messages they have received and then wait until
they have not received anything for at least two full message propagation peri-
ods. When this happens they can be reasonably sure that other peers have seen
all the same messages, and, crucially, other peers have seen the pause (the full
stop if you will) in the overall traffic. This shared observation can be leveraged
to obtain a de-facto consensus on a set of transactions that can then be safely
sorted by some canonical criterion (like a cryptographic hash) and appended,
in that order, to the distributed ledger.
Unfortunately, we cannot assume that the frequency with which peers are
sending each other transactions is anywhere near low enough for this scheme to
work.
At this point, proof-of-work schemes can be helpful. Proof-of-work schemes
generally consist of mathematical puzzles (i.e.: finding an input to a crypto-
graphic hash that starts with a required number of zeros). In particular, these
puzzles are based on problems that we assume can only be solved by brute-force
search.
Because of the latter property, proof-of-work constitutes a guarantee that
the party providing it has expended a lot of effort in obtaining it. But, more
interestingly for us, it also places an upper-bound on the frequency with which
a peer (with only finite hashing power) can produce such proof-of-work. More-
over, by adjusting the level of work required, we can calibrate this upper-bound
arbitrarily low as our network requires for achieving distributed consensus.
As such, proof-of-work can be a tool to force the frequency of transactions
down to a level where these transactions may serve as a the basis for a de-facto
distributed consensus.
2
3 Cooperative Proof of Work
In this section we formalize our cooperative proof-of-work scheme that addresses
the problem of bringing down the frequency of message streams (in order to
achieve distributed consensus).
3.1 Blocks
Let P be a set if public keys that allows to identify participants uniquely and
check their cryptographic signatures.
Let h(·) be some, suitably strong, cryptographic hash function. We assume
that h is defined for all finite, atomic objects that we will introduce in the
remainder. In addition we assume h(·) is defined for finite products by hashing
the concatenation of the (self delimiting) canonical binary representation of the
individual elements.
We now give a recursive definition of the set of blocks, which can be seen as
the containing objects for the possible transactions on our distributed ledger.
First we define the set B0 of all basic blocks. To this end we first define
a set of basic entries E that participants can request to be entered into the
distributed ledger. We will not consider the internal structure or semantics of
the set of basic entries here (since this is very application specific).
We now define a basic block as a a signed pair (r, e)p for some public key
p ∈ P , some basic entry e ∈ E and some nonce r ∈ N. The interpretation is that
a basic block represents a request by user p to enter entry e into the distributed
ledger, r is a nonce that will be used as a proof-of-work as explained below.
For every basic block b ∈ B0 we define the characteristic hash b
# = h(r, h(e, p)).
We let z ∈ N be our cryptographic hash zero threshold parameter. We require
z to be strictly less than the length of our cryptographic hash values. We now
say a basic block b ∈ B0 is proved iff the initial z binary digits of b
# are zero.
With B#0 we denote the set of all proved basic blocks.
Under this definition, proved basic blocks must be mined. This means that a
user needs to do brute force search in order to find a suitable nonce r such that
the latter condition holds. It follows that z must be sufficiently low to allow a
single user to mine basic blocks with adequate frequency and at acceptable power
levels. We will leave open what “adequate” and “acceptable” mean precisely in
this context (since this is very application specific).
Next we define the set Bn of compound blocks of level n in terms of proved
blocks of level n− 1 as follows. We let d ∈ N be our cryptographic hash nesting
depth parameter. We require d ≥ 2, in order to avoid some degenerate cases
in the definitions that follow. We now define a compound block of level n as a
signed sequence of proved sub-blocks (b1, b2, . . . , bd)p for some public key p ∈ P
and some b1, b2 . . . , bd ∈ B
#
n−1.
For every compound block (b1, b2, . . . , bd)p ∈ Bn we recursively define the
characteristic hash using d nested applications of our cryptographic hash func-
tion b# = h(b#1 , h(b
#
2 , h(. . . h(b
#
d , p)))). We now say a compound block b ∈ Bn
is proved iff the initial z + n binary digits of b# are zero (or all digits in case
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z + n is greater than the length of the hash). With B#n we denote the set of all
proved compound blocks of level n.
Under this definition, proved compound blocks must be mined, as before. In
this case, the mining entails that a user needs to do brute force search in order
to find a suitable ordered sequence of sub-blocks such that the latter condition
holds. By our definition each increase in level makes the mining of compound
blocks precisely twice as hard (as long as we do not exceed the length of our
cryptographic hash values).
Note that mining a compound block is different from mining a basic block
in that it necessarily involves mixing sub-blocks together. As a nice side-effect,
this gives miners that do not discriminate between sub-blocks a competitive
advantage over miners that do. This effect becomes more pronounced as we
increase the d hashing depth parameter. The latter observation is the reason
we expect our scheme to offer a better defense against discrimination of (groups
of) users by other (groups of) users.
We wrap up our definition of blocks by defining B =
⋃
n∈NB
#
n as the set of
all proved blocks. In addition we define B≥m =
⋃
n∈N.n≥mB
#
n as the set of all
proved blocks of level n or higher.
3.2 Streams
We define a block stream as a function A : R+ → 2B mapping instances in time
(as positive real numbers) to sets of proved basic/compound blocks arriving at
that time instance (from the perspective of a single peer). We require A(0) = ∅,
in order to avoid some bootstrapping issues in the definitions that follow.
We can look at A as a single stream but we can also view A as being com-
prised of several streams at several levels. More precisely, for some minimal
level m ∈ N we can define Am : R
+ → 2B≥m as the restriction of A to B≥m, i.e.:
Am(t) = A(t) ∩ B≥m. Since, by our current definition, the difficulty of mining
a block at level n is precisely twice as difficult as mining a block at level n− 1,
this means that we would expect the frequency of messages to go down at some
point as we go up in the level of the message streams.
When exactly the frequency will be low enough to establish consensus will
be determined by the total hashing power available in the network as well as
the time it takes a message to be become common knowledge. In the remainder
we will formulate the relevant criterion that may be used to determine (from
the perspective of a single peer) when consensus has been reached.
So let ∆ ∈ R+ be our full-stop time duration parameter. We say A was quiet
for level n at time t iff no blocks of level n or higher arrived in the interval
(t−∆, t], i.e.: ∀t′ ∈ (t−∆, t].An(t) = ∅.
Based on this, we define a function Q : R+ → N that maps every time
instance to the lowest level n for which A was quiet at that time instance, i.e.:
Q(t) = min{n | An(t) = ∅}.
We now use a transfinite recursion to define the ledger stream as a function
L : R+ → 2E mapping instances in time to the maximal sets of entries that
become part of the ledger at that time (from the perspective of any of the
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peers). In particular we let L(0) = ∅ and for t > 0 we let e ∈ L(t) iff e does
not occur earlier in the ledger stream yet at some preceding time t′ < t a block
b ∈ AQ(t)(t
′) arrived such that e is part of b (either directly or indirectly).
A peer can implement this consensus ledger by simply waiting for quiet
streams (on all levels) and, as soon a stream goes quiet, inserting any and all
so far unseen entries that are contained in the so far untreated blocks in that
stream. Please note that, although the definition refers to all blocks in the
history of the stream, in practice, once all entries that are part of a given block
have been entered into the ledger this block may be discarded from memory
(because it cannot affect the ledger anymore).
4 Conclusion
We have formalized a novel cooperative proof-of-work scheme, which constitutes
a refinement to the well known, and widely used, proof-of-work scheme of zeroing
a cryptographic hash. We have discussed some of the intuitions behind this
cooperative scheme as well as some of the potential benefits that the cooperative
scheme may offer over the non-cooperative scheme in practical applications. As
future work we are interested in implementation and experimental validation of
this scheme.
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